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1 Moderates in the eye of the beholders
In the post-9/11 context, the term ‘moderate
Islamists’ has come to be very much in vogue.
Many think tanks and scholars of Islam and
democratisation in the USA in particular, have
promoted a policy of Western engagement with
moderate Islamist movements in the Middle
East (The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, The Centre for the Study of
Islam and Democracy; Brown et al. 2006; Hamid
2007; Ibrahim 2006; Wickham 2002). Moderate
Islamists are defined as those who ‘reject
violence and endorse competition through
pluralistic politics’ (Hamzawy 2005: 2). It is a
form of labelling that pro-Islamist movements
sympathisers inside the Middle East have
adopted. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), one of
the movements that was labelled ‘moderate’ in
accordance with the definition cited above, is
presenting itself in those terms on its English
website,1 presumably for a Western audience,
since this does not feature on the Arabic website.
There are several arguments formulated in
favour of an inclusive policy towards ‘moderate’
Islamists. The first is that as movements that
denounce violence as a means of accession to
power, they present a counterweight to the
extremist radical Islamists, and therefore
represent the kind of political forces that should
be promoted as versions of the ‘reformist’ Islam.
Second, is that no democratisation in the Middle
East is viable without the inclusion of ‘moderate’
Islamist parties, since they hold much popularity
on the street which neither authoritarian regimes
nor secular political parties and movements can
claim. In Egypt, the results of the parliamentary
elections of 2005 signalled that the Muslim
Brotherhood were the most organised political
force with wide appeal that could seriously
compete with the ruling party, the National
Democratic Party. While the majority of
Egyptians did not vote, the Muslim Brotherhood
was still able to win enough votes to secure 20 per
cent of the seats in parliament. Third, is that they
represent the potential for progress and reform
within the Islamic movements in particular in
view of their flexibility and more sophisticated
thinking (Brown et al. 2006: 19).
This article examines the extent of flexibility
and reform characterising the Muslim
Brotherhood’s contemporary engagement with
the gender agenda – an agenda that cannot be
detached from the wider democratisation
agenda. Since such an agenda is very broad and
issues are historically contextual; the focus here
is on gender roles and division of labour and
women in power, leadership and politics.2 To do
so, the position of Hassan al-Banna3 on key
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issues, was compared with the positions of the
current leadership published in the most recent
official documents and is complemented with
interviews with members of the movement and
some ethnographic work.
The article makes three postulations. First, that
the ambiguity over what represents the
movement is a political strategy deployed to
maximise manoeuvring space, to allow the
Muslim Brotherhood to represent itself as some
very different things to diverse parties. Second,
the repression at the hands of the government
has served to divert attention from some internal
matters, gender inequalities being one of them.
Third, that those highly regressive gender norms
in society and the weakening of social forces with
progressive gender agendas (such as the feminist
movement) means that the Muslim Brotherhood
is not under pressure to reconsider, justify or be
held accountable for gender discriminatory
stances.
2 Representation, voice and methodological
conundrums
Despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood
was established as a civic association (non-
governmental organisation, NGO) in 1928 by
Hassan al-Banna, it quickly developed from a
strictly religious organisation proselytising
adherence to true religious values to one with a
political and social vision for Egypt. Rashwan
(2006) identifies the time since the conception of
the Brotherhood up to the late 1940s as a time of
building the foundation and outreach. An
important historical turn in state-movement
relations from 1951–4 ended with a great
confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Nasserite government and signalled the
beginning of the systematic repression of
members of the movement. Under the new
leadership of President Sadat, the movement
entered a ‘rebirth’ as it witnessed the release of
imprisoned members of the MB. This was part of
a strategy of strengthening the Islamist
movement in Egypt in order to contain the
perceived ‘communist threat’ emanating from
groups that were sympathetic to Nasser’s
socialist beliefs, and communist and Marxist
leaning groups. It was in that political and
economic context, in which Sadat adopted an
open market policy characterised by the state’s
retreat from free welfare provision, that the
Muslim Brotherhood movement was revived.
During this historical period, they successfully
reached out to the middle-class that formed its
new rank and file (after the previous
membership had all but dissolved under the
Nasserite government) and that were to occupy
key policy and decision-making positions in the
government and civil society organisations
(Rashwan 2006: 41).
The assassination of President Sadat in 1981 at
the hands of a member of the more radical and
militant Islamist group, Jihad, brought President
Mubarak to power in the same year. Rashwan
characterises the Muslim Brotherhood’s
relationship with the government under the
Mubarak regime as undergoing three stages. The
first is from 1981–8, in which the government
treated the movement with clemency and
tolerance, and which enabled the Brotherhood to
build a populist base, especially through its much
needed social services and benefits that were
extended to a population that did not share in
the wealth accumulated by a small class of
entrepreneurs under the open market economy.
From 1988 to 1992, the Brotherhood’s
relationship with the government began to sour
as the latter’s suspicions and fears were
heightened when faced with the scale of
Brotherhood activity and membership and in the
light of the movement’s lack of condemnation of
the militant Islamist terrorist attacks on tourists
and government figures (Rashwan 2006:42).
From 1993 to the present, relations have been
characterised by confrontation, and the
authorities have pursued a policy of repression,
detaining leading figures and members of the
movement. Although officially outlawed, the
movement is allowed to exist on the political
landscape and has been actively engaged in the
political process (Choubaky 2006).
Organisationally, the Muslim Brotherhood is led
by the Supreme Guide and supported by the
Guidance Bureau, the political bureau which is
elected by members of the Shura (majlis al Shura:
Consultative Council). There is a highly
elaborate structure on the ground, regulating
relations among rank and file. The Muslim
Brotherhood also has its own Mufti which issues
fatwas (religious opinions) for its members.
Like other religious/political movements, the
Muslim Brotherhood is not a uniform political
group, and is the site for power struggles between
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 1  January 2011 89
different factions representing different
ideological positions. Some have argued that the
power struggle lies between the Old Guard
representing the conservative elements and the
reformists who tend to be younger in age. The
difference in position between members from the
more conservative and the reformist elements
can sometimes, as will be shown below, suggest
that two contradictory positions are being
articulated, and both claim to be legitimately
representing the Muslim Brotherhood.
The author sought direction from the former
Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef, as well
as other members of the Guidance Bureau on the
methodological approach to pursue in order to
arrive at a legitimate representation of the
Brotherhood. A virtually unanimous opinion is
that any official endorsement by the Supreme
Guide should be taken as the authoritative,
undisputed source of reference on the Muslim
Brotherhood’s viewpoint, i.e. the writings that
have resala min al ikhwan (message from the
Brothers) inscribed on it. In addition to these, a
number of official documents are considered
representative. The methodology relied on the
examination and analysis of a series of sources.
First, Hassan al-Banna’s main work on the
subject in view of his central role as the founder
of the movement and first supreme Guide and in
order to gain an understanding of the position of
the Muslim Brotherhood at its conception and
until his death in 1949. Second, the official
documents published, such as Al-Mubadara in
1994, the party election agenda published in 2006
and more recently, the party platform published
in 2007.4 These were however, complemented
with interviews with key women leaders within
the movement as well as prominent members of
the Guidance Bureau in 2008.5 Earlier political
ethnographic work conducted in a poor squatter
settlement of Cairo also shed light on elements of
agency, and perspectives from the rank and file.
Many members of the movement insisted that
other than the official documents, no single
person’s views could be considered as
representing legitimately the views of the
movement as a whole and could only be
considered to speak for herself/himself. The
restriction of official representation to a number
of generic documents, and making all other
sources open for contestation allows the Muslim
Brotherhood to pursue a political strategy that
entails relaying different images of itself to
different audiences. For example, to the Western
world and Western-affiliated scholars, leaders
from the reformist wing such as Abd el Moneim
Abou el Fotouh and Essam el Erian conveys a
highly progressive image of the Brotherhood, yet
their views on women’s rights is unrepresentative
of the majority of the members of the Guidance
Bureau and rank and file.6 And to members
raised in the pedagogical training of the Muslim
Brotherhood to become the movement’s rank
and file, their engagement would be with the
writings of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sheikh
Mohammed al-Ghazali, Dr Mohammed Ghozlan,
al Baheyi Al Kholi, Tawfik al Wa’i, Abd el
Mota’al Al Gabry, Mustafa al Seba’i, Abd el
Halim Abou Shouka and Salem Al Bahnasawy
who for the most part carry very different
viewpoints on gender issues than the reformists.
And to members of the Muslim Brotherhood who
have particular queries on particular matters,
there is also the mufti, whose fatwas are relayed
through other channels.7
3 Gender roles, the public and the private
Hassan al-Banna highlights his views on the
position and role of Muslim women in a rare
article published in 1940 entitled ‘resalet al mar’a
al muslima’ addressing the members of the MB.
The basis for writing the resala, explained al-
Banna is the need to remind believers of the
decrees of Islam on women’s role in society in the
light of what he sees as the Muslim world’s bid to
emulate the West, a quest which has led them to
seek ways of conforming the decrees of Islam to
European orders and ways. ‘In reality, this
country [Egypt] and other Islamic countries have
come under the shadow of a revolutionary and
vicious wave’, he writes, explaining that this
wave is, ‘the love of emulating Europe and
immersing itself in it right to the chin’ (1980: 4).
He reflects that those that wish to be like the
Europeans have not stopped there, ‘but they try
to deceive themselves by twisting the laws of
Islam according to their Western liking and
European orders/systems and to take advantage
of the leniency of this religion [Islam] and the
flexibility of its laws’ (1980: 5). According to al-
Banna, such manipulation of Islamic texts,
‘totally removes these laws from its Islamic form
and transforms [these laws] into other
orders/systems that have nothing to do with it
[Islam] under any circumstance. They totally
ignore the spirit of Islamic jurisprudence [and
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they also ignore] many of the texts that do not
agree with their liking’ (1980: 5). Hassan al-
Banna sees this is as doubly dangerous, since it is
not enough for them to deviate but that:
they try to find legal justification for this and
they try to cover it up with pretence of it being
halal [religiously sanctioned] and permissible
… What is important now is that we examine
the decrees of Islam with a view devoid of our
personal inclinations, and prepare ourselves to
accept Allah’s orders especially in this matter
which is crucial for our contemporary
renaissance. (al-Banna 1980: 6)
Al-Banna broaches issues that were the subject
of intense debate at the time of the formation
and spread of the Brotherhood: women’s entry
into tertiary education to study sciences and
humanities, gender segregation being challenged
and the increased visibility of women in public,
urban spaces. Hassan al-Banna makes three
principle arguments in his article, the first
relating to women’s status in Islam, the second
addresses the religious premise behind the
division of gender roles according to sex, and the
third, the attraction between the opposite sexes
and its role in preserving the complementarities
in roles between men and women according to
their sex. The first point relating to Islam’s
valuation of women is briefly broached in one
paragraph. Hassan al-Banna affirms that Islam
has elevated the status of woman, and recognises
her as a partner to man in rights and duties. In
the second point, he qualifies the earlier
statement by contending that the difference
between man and woman in rights is attributable
to their different natures and in accordance with
the different roles assigned to each (1980: 7).
This differentiation of roles according to sex, he
affirms, is also for the maintenance of the rights
granted to each. In that, he suggests that where
men were given more rights, women were
compensated for this in other areas. He
emphasises that this division of roles is derived
from their biology/nature. This strict
prescription of well defined gender roles based
on biological differences guides the rest of the
article vis-à-vis women’s role in a Muslim society.
The implications of these gender divisions of
roles are described under the rubric of the need
for preserving a particular order between men
and women, and for which the rest of the article
is dedicated.
Women’s exit into the public arena for other
more worldly purposes is rejected by al-Banna as
anathema to Islam and its decrees:
This fascistic8 mingling of sexes among us in
schools, institutes and public gatherings and
their going out to places of entertainment,
restaurants, parks … all of this is foreign
goods which have absolutely no relation to
Islam and has had the worst effects in our
social life. (al-Banna 1980: 18)
He refutes the argument that there is no Islamic
text/verse to prohibit women from engaging in
public works, arguing that just because there is
no verse against hitting parents, it does not
mean that it is permissible. Al-Banna recognises
that under some ‘social circumstances’ a woman
goes out to work, but if this occurs, he warns that
first, women must adhere to the conditions
mentioned above (re: appropriate attire
revealing only palms and face, etc.) and that it is
a duty for her that her work be within the dire
necessities, and ‘not as a general rule/
organisation that it be for a woman to have a
right to work in principle’ (1980: 21).
Today, the official framing of ideas on gender
roles espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood in
relation to gender issues is very different from
that of al-Banna’s rhetoric. However, the essence
of the message vis-à-vis gender roles bears a
striking resonance to Hasan al-Banna’s
exaltation of women’s role as mothers and wives,
especially in terms of the reference to the ‘noble
task’ and ‘noble mission’ and in its presentation
of the domestic realm as a sanctuary where she
exercises her lordship and power. For example,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s election platform of
2006, states that:
We must not forget that the woman has a
noble and significant task entrusted to her by
Allah Almighty, child-bearing and
motherhood. A man cannot undertake this
most noble of tasks, which is being denigrated
today by some; furthermore the human race
itself would disappear in the absence of this
process. Moreover, it is the mother that
suckles the baby with her milk, giving out of
care, nurturing the child, the effects of which
remain with him throughout his life. The
woman is also the mistress of the house (rabat
al bayt) and it is her task to care for the family
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 1  January 2011 91
and prepare the home as a place of comfort;
her role is a huge responsibility and noble
mission that must not be in any way neglected
or underestimated. (Muslim Brotherhood
2006a)
While the official statement of January 2006
does not go specifically into the limitations and
conditions of work outside the home, as is the
case with Hassan al-Banna’s earlier message, it
nevertheless reveals not only the undesirability
of work for women, but also the need for
regulating woman’s work. A woman can work
only if given permission by her husband.
According to the statement:
These characteristics, duties and rights which
have been allocated to women by Allah are in
balance with the duties she has towards her
husband and her children. These duties must
be given precedence over other
responsibilities and they are necessary for the
stability of the family which is the basic cell of
the society and the cause for its cohesion,
strength, and efficiency. However, the husband
has a right to permit his wife to work. This
right is to be regulated by an agreement
between the husband and the wife. Such
rights should not be regulated by law and the
authorities should not interfere with them
except in some rare cases. (Muslim
Brotherhood 2006a)
In other words, on a policy level, the Muslim
Brotherhood is opposed to any constitutional
guarantee of women’s right to work as citizens.
While the statement talks about the ‘regulation’
of men’s right to permit his wife to work through
agreement between them, it is ultimately the
man who has the right to allow or prohibit his
wife from working. The draft Party Platform of
2007 discussion of the issue of women’s roles and
the question of work reflects more Mohammed
Habib’s framing of the argument in terms of
complementarity of roles.
The 2007 Platform argues that although
women’s role in the workforce is to be
recognised, such a role has to be ‘balanced with
the noble mission that a woman bears in her
home and among her children for the sake of the
uprightness of the first foundations of society’
(2007: 103). The remaining paragraph, however,
does not talk about complementarities between
women’s home and work roles; rather, it provides
a typical Muslim Brotherhood justification for a
woman’s association with the domestic, premised
on her biological nature and the division of roles
deriving from it. The Platform argues that while
the Muslim Brotherhood recognises women’s full
equality with men in their humanity,
nonetheless, there needs to be an emphasis on:
… the importance of preserving the
distinction between them in social and human
roles, without this affecting the status of each
of them. The role of women in the family is
founded on the premise that she holds the
primary/main responsibility for raising the
new generation … consequently we believe in
the importance of finding balance in the roles
of women and reviving her role in the family
and public life without imposing on her duties
which conflict with her nature or with her role
in the family. We believe that the roles that
women [should] espouse are an outcome of a
social consensus built on the Islamic
civilisational terms of reference (marja’iyya).
(Muslim Brotherhood Platform 2007: 103)
Of significance here, is the use of the language
of protection: refraining from imposing duties
outside her nature, the language of democracy:
roles should be based on a social consensus which
derives its premise from an Islamic reference
point, etc. While individual women within the
movement have deviated from the above model
(such as Zeinab el Ghazali below), this position is
not merely an ideal, it reflects the dominant
discourse and stance, one which has much
currency among both men and women in the
movement, despite some generational variation.
4 Power, politics and leadership
Hassan al-Banna’s position on women’s political
activism was largely shapely by his belief in a
clear gender division of roles in which women’s
domestic responsibilities take centre stage.
Consequently, when in 1944 the Egyptian
parliament was debating whether to grant
women the right to vote or not (and which they
voted against), Hassan al-Banna’s position was
negative towards the whole women’s right to vote
campaign, believing that it was intended to
divert women’s attention from her principle role
in the family as a mother and as one entrusted
with the raising of the children (El Deiry 2007:
323). Women members of the Muslim
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Brotherhood were active politically in support of
the movement, as were their counterparts in
other political movements, yet women’s full
political rights were only officially recognised in
1956 when Egypt achieved universal suffrage
following a long struggle led by the Egyptian
feminist movement.9 However, the question of
gender and political leadership became
politically salient in the 1970s, and many writers
within the MB movement began to engage with
it. Among the most notable was the then Mufti of
the movement, Sheikh Abd Allah el Khattib, who
insisted in a fatwa that the principle of Qawãmah
(leadership or guardianship) was not only
reserved for men in the private sphere but in the
public as well.10 The Brotherhood’s Mubadara
later argued that:
The boundaries of men’s qawãmah over their
wives is restricted to marital partnership only
and it is a qawãmah of sincerity and
mercifulness and consultation in return for
responsibilities born[e] by the husband.11
Leading women members of the MB such as
Helmy have framed men’s qawãmah over women
in terms of human rights: ‘We raise the banner
of men’s qawãmah as a right for woman and not
for man’, she affirmed, explaining that it is men
who are required and obligated to earn a living
and provide for the household and not the
woman.12 The fact that a woman is not required
to earn her bread is for Helmy one of the
privileges accorded to women as a result of men’s
qawãmah. In practical terms, while Helmy talks
about men’s obligation to provide for the
household as a woman’s right, there are a
plethora of personal and economic factors that
would prevent a man from being able to provide
for his family (such as unemployment) and for
which it would be difficult for women to hold
them accountable. In such a context, a man’s
qawãmah over women in terms of power
relationship does not change accordingly, unless
a woman wishes to apply for a divorce.
On the other hand, while the principle of
qawãmah is applicable to both the domestic and
the public spheres according to the fatwa of 1981,
the current official MB position is that qawãmah
is only applicable to martial relations. ‘The
boundaries of men’s qawãmah over their wives is
restricted to marital partnership only and it is a
qawãmah of sincerity and mercifulness and
consultation in return for responsibilities born by
the husband’. By narrowing the sphere of the
exercise of men’s qawãmah over women to marital
relations in the contemporary Muslim
Brotherhood’s discourse, the question of women’s
occupation of leadership positions also shifts but
not automatically. If men exercise their qawãmah
at home to restrict women’s sphere of influence
and leadership to the household (vis-à-vis
domestic responsibility), then the scope for
agency outside the home is limited. This is a
critical issue which some members of the Islamic
movement face when they marry. In some cases,
husbands have insisted that their spouses, highly
active members of the movement prior to
marriage, shift their energy into domestic
responsibilities. Hence, in such circumstances,
women’s exercise of full agency may be, under
certain circumstances, severely hindered by the
underlying ideologically framed gender division
of roles and its manipulation by some members
to advance their own personal agendas.13
The fact that qawãmah is restricted to the private
sphere means that women are not denying
categorically the possibility of holding leadership
positions over men. Women are allowed to hold a
variety of positions, including that of Member of
Parliament and Shura and minister provided a
number of conditions are met (to be discussed
later). In other words, they are allowed to not
only vote but run for particular offices. The role
of female members of the Muslim Brotherhood
in the national parliamentary elections was
instrumental for securing the victories that they
have achieved, including in the last elections of
2005. It was the women members of the Muslim
Brotherhood who, with their access to people via
mosques (in particular the women’s section of
the mosques), the welfare organisations and
access to homes, created a constituency and
mobilised them to support the Brotherhood. In
addition to their pivotal role in outreach in the
wider community, women’s votes represented a
significant bulk of the votes that went to the
Brotherhood. A recent study on women in the
parliamentary elections of 2005 (Blaydes and
Tarouti 2009) suggests that women have proven
to be highly effective political recruiters for
Muslim Brotherhood candidates. In addition,
high turnout of veiled voters at women’s polling
stations creates common knowledge about the
popularity of Islamist candidates in a particular
district, and the presence of female activists cuts
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down on the likelihood and effectiveness of
government repression. The participation of
Islamist women in the face of repression and
hardship also serves as a powerful and politically
motivating symbol for both male and female
voters who are inclined toward the Muslim
Brotherhood (Blaydes and Tarouti 2009: 365).
The Brotherhood’s support for women to run for
political office has been more evasive. In the last
elections of 2005, the Brotherhood only fielded
one candidate, Makarem el Deiry for a middle-
class Cairene electoral district. She lost and
appealed against the results of the elections on
the basis that there was vote rigging. The fact
that the Brotherhood only fielded one woman out
of many candidates fielded is not unique to the
MB, other political parties did not do much
better, including the progressive leftist Tagammu
party.14 Most political parties do not have
politically seasoned women, and rarely would
they have the kind of outreach that women
members of the Muslim Brotherhood have via
the religious and welfare services that are
provided under the banner of the movement.
In view of the greater opportunities for political
apprenticeship and leadership for Muslim
Brotherhood women within the community
compared with their counterparts in other
political parties and forces, the pool of women
who can potentially run for office, backed by a
substantial constituency is greater and
accordingly, the fact that so few are fielded by
the Muslim Brotherhood is significant. It means
that activist members have not been voicing a
demand to assume leadership positions or that
they have not collectively mobilised around this
(the latter is the view expressed by El Deiry).
In an informal interview with a leading member
of the Brotherhood vis-à-vis the forthcoming
elections of 2010, in which a women’s quota will
be applied for the first time, he said that the
difficulty is not in finding qualified women but
that few women want to run. The problem, he
argued, is that in view of the security harassments
of Muslim Brotherhood candidates by the
government, fielding a woman carries certain
risks. A husband’s or family’s permission to allow
women to field the elections is absolutely
necessary if the MB were to extend support to a
woman candidate, however, in view of the
hardships entailed, such support is not always
possible to secure. If a husband does not support
his wife’s candidature, then the Brotherhood
cannot support her. The fact that support for
women candidates is conditional upon a husband’s
consent indicates the way in which the concept of
qawãmah at home is very much adhered to in daily
policy and practice. However, equally significant is
the extent to which the government’s repression
of the MB is undermining the spaces and
opportunities for gendered transformations within
the movement. Hypothetically speaking, if the
Muslim Brotherhood was not subject to
government repression, the justification for not
rewarding capable women with more leadership
opportunities would not have been so
complacently accepted. In the absence of a
political pretext to absolve the Brotherhood of
their responsibility towards activist women, their
real commitment to women assuming political
leadership would have been tested.
By far the most renowned female figure in the
history of the Muslim Brotherhood was Zeinab el
Ghazali (2 January 1917–8 August 2005) who
divorced her first husband because he came in the
way of her da’wa (prosletising mission) and who
was subject to extreme forms of torture under the
Nasserite regime in the 1960s as a consequence of
her activism.15 Yet for Hoda Abdel Moneim,
Camillia Helmy and Makarem el Deiry, they
viewed Zeinab el Ghazali as an exceptional figure
and insist that not all women are called to become
like her. From the conversations above, it became
clear that while Zeinab el Ghazali is one of the
most exonerated leaders for her courage, defiance
and commitment to the Brotherhood, her
experience serves as a harsh reminder of
government cruelty, rather than as an example to
be emulated. Yet while el Ghazali was highly
respected within the Brotherhood, she was never a
member of the Guidance Bureau. Today, none of
the 17 members of the Guidance Bureau are
women. When asked as to the reason behind their
absence, the answer given by Habib and others is
that putting women in leadership positions would
make them more conspicuous to the ruling
authority. However, there are questions as to
whether this is a form of protection or a systematic
exclusion from power. In other words, the full
agency of women political activists in the MB is
not only limited by the contextual dynamics, but
also by an ideological salafi16 position shared by an
overwhelming majority of its members of the
movement, as Abd el Latif observes:
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The conservative view is that women can best
serve the cause through their traditional roles
as mothers and wives but not as political
actors or peers in the movement.
Consequently efforts to expand the role of the
Sister activists in movement structures and
political activities meet determined
resistance, particularly from members living
outside the capital. This conservative culture
is being challenged to some extent by the
younger generation of Brothers in the cities,
but this group is a minority. Although they
receive some encouragement from the
reform-minded wing of the Brotherhood, they
are frustrated. It appears that the majority of
rank and file of both sexes hold a very
conservative view of women’s roles in the
public sphere. (Abd el Latif 2008: 14)
It is significant that the contemporary MB
standpoint is that there are certain positions
that a woman is not allowed to hold, for example
according to the Mubadara, women are prohibited
from assuming the position of the Supreme
Imamate ‘and positions corresponding to it’,17 i.e.
the position that is equivalent to the highest
leadership position in the country, such as
President or Prime Minister, etc.18 Makarem el
Deiry defended against the MB’s prohibition of
women holding the position of president on the
basis that it relieves her of immense burdens and
protects her from any possible harm. She
suggested that wars are declared and waged by
heads of governments (presidents) who
sometimes have to engage in very bloody events.
‘Hence, Islam does not want to expose her to any
dangers or put her in a compromising position’,
she affirmed. Members of the reform wing in the
Muslim Brotherhood such as Abou el Fotouh
suggest that change of times in future may bring
about a situation where it is permissible for
women to hold the position of president (a
position that he has openly advocated).
The position of the Muslim Brotherhood today is
the prohibition of women from leading a Muslim
country and is framed with strong paternalistic
overtones of relieving women from undertaking a
role for which nature has not equipped them: 
For our part, we believe that the
responsibilities required of the head of state,
and these are responsibilities of wellaya
[governance] and leadership of the army
which are considered responsibilities that
should not be imposed on women to shoulder
because they conflict with her nature and her
other social and human roles.
(Muslim Brotherhood Party Platform 2007: 103)
The above position suggests that the overall
standpoint on gender roles delineated according
to biological differences which was outlined by
al-Banna many decades earlier continues to
inform the Brotherhood’s vision today. Despite
this being the official position of the movement,
while Abou el Fotouh has openly announced his
rejection of such a stance thereby speaking the
voice of the progressives to the outside world and
affirming the external image that though the
movement is heterogeneous, there continues to
be progressive elements within it that will make
the movement a ‘moderate’ one.
Yet it is unlikely that Abou el Fotouh’s
perspective will gain currency among the
members of the rank and file of the Brotherhood
or its leadership if the current political and
sociocultural context remains unchanged. The
Brotherhood’s prohibition of women from
leading the country is a position that is
analogous with an opinion earlier expressed by
Sheikh Ahmed el Tayeb, the former Grand Mufti
of Al-Azhar, the country’s leading Islamic
establishment and one of the most renowned
sources of authority for Sunni Muslims. When
prominent Egyptian feminist Nawal el Saadawi
announced that she would run for president in
the presidential elections of 2004 (which she
later retracted), the grand mufti of Egypt
responded by issuing a fatwa (religious opinion)
that prohibited women from assuming the
position of president. Sheikh Ali Gomaa, the
Grand Mufti later clarified that a woman could
lead a modern Muslim state, although the earlier
fatwa he had issued had already been widely
disseminated and gained much ground.19
The objections expressed by the secularists to
such a compromise on women’s full citizenship in
the MB Party Platform were weak – particularly
in comparison to how vocal they were in their
rejection of the Brotherhood’s position on
prohibiting non-Muslims from assuming the
position of president. Moreover, despite a
number of feminist activists’ critiques, a
weakened and fragmented feminist movement in
Egypt failed to mobilise a unified collective
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platform to contest the Muslim Brotherhood’s
stance on women’s assumption of political
leadership of a country. (This was despite the
fact that the Brotherhood’s platform was widely
discussed for a sustained and prolonged period of
several weeks that had given them plenty of time
for organising politically).
The MB’s announcement of a political stance
against women’s right to hold the position of
president did not only generate minimal
opposition from political and civil society, but was
in harmony with the religious-patriarchal
normative ideals entrenched in contemporary
Egyptian society. In a recent survey undertaken
by the UNDP, only 45.9 per cent of Egyptians
asked, believe women should have the right to
become prime minister, and a mere 25.7 per cent
believe women should have the right to become
head of state.20
5 Reformed or reframed?
The overall ideological foundation of the MB
contemporary stance on gender issues has not
changed: women and men have strictly defined
social roles based on their sex. All matters
relating to men’s and women’s status and
responsibilities and duties derive from this vision:
though the contemporary MB discourse no longer
advocates the restricted presence of women in the
public sphere. Perhaps the most important shift in
the position of the Muslim Brotherhood has been
in its delineation of the limits of qawãmah,
restricting it to the private domain. The
pertinence of this position shift lies in its
ramifications on women’s occupation of leadership
positions which necessarily entail women’s
direction/leadership over women as well as men.
Yet women’s occupation of leadership positions
excludes the presidency as well as the imamate in
prayer, and is conditional upon the fulfilment of
certain conditions (in terms of mode of conduct
and appearance) as well as conditions guaranteed
in society (no threats to women’s modesty, etc.).
The above suggests that while some progress has
been made in terms of a narrower definition of
the application of qawãmah, as well as with
respect to expanding women’s freedom in the
public sphere, still men’s qawãmah in the private
sphere can effectively prevent women’s
participation in the public sphere, in terms of
work or occupation of leadership positions. What
this suggests is that a fundamental reform in
their gendered approach to the position of
women has not taken place. The MB’s approach
contests the notion that they are committed to
the principles of universal citizenship since there
are crucial challenges to the concept of women’s
political rights. In this respect, widening the
scope of women’s inclusiveness in the public
realm still falls significantly short of even
securing the modicum of rights that women in
Egypt currently enjoy in the constitution, which
is gender blind vis-à-vis the gender of the head of
state.
If the agenda has not been reformed, it has been
reframed in multiple ways. First, there is a far
more sophisticated framing of arguments in a
way that draws on political discourses in vogue.
Hence, rather than framing positions in terms of
‘it is prohibited for women to do x or y’, it is now
framed in terms of a human rights discourse –
women’s right to enjoy the benefits of men’s
qawãmah; women’s right to protection from
assuming roles incompatible with their biological
nature, which is also simultaneously framed in a
paternalistic discourse of protecting women.
There are several dynamics from which to shed
light on the current standpoint – both internal
and external. Internally, it is the conservative
wing of the Brotherhood and one which has the
greatest support among the rank and file that
has the most power in the Guidance Bureau. It is
likely to continue to remain faithful to the
mainstream doctrine regarding gender
hierarchies and divisions of labour, both of which
favour men. The liberal faction is quite sidelined
for the time being, so its prospects of influence
have been contained. Moreover, women members
of the Muslim Brotherhood have been excluded
from holding significant posts of power within
the movement, with no representation in the
Guidance Bureau at all, historically or at
present. Even if they were to resume positions of
power, it would all depend on who is represented,
since many women do adhere to the current
doctrine, even if their personal lives betray clear
deviations from the official stances.
Concurrently, a number of external factors have
served to undermine the current prospects for
revision and flexibility within the movement:
these include government repression; a society
where the social and political culture has been
heavily influenced by Salafi thinking in particular
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vis-à-vis gender issues and which the Muslim
Brotherhood has contributed towards through
the promotion of a process of Islamisation of
society from below, and the absence of an
organised force of significant political weight,
internal or external that would push the
Brotherhood to reconsider the political
repercussions of non-reform, in other words a
force to be reckoned with. While the active
agency of a minority of women affiliated to the
Muslim Brotherhood in pressing for progressive
change is not to be overlooked, it would be naive
to underestimate the ideological and political
odds against them at this historical conjuncture.
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Notes
1 See The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood on the
Brotherhood’s website: www.ikhwanweb.com/
article.php?id=2107 (accessed 18 October
2010).
2 Hence, issues pertaining to reproductive
health, social customs and family matters are
discussed in a longer, future article.
3 The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
4 Translated from Arabic to English by the author.
5 These include an interview with the former
Supreme Guide and Muhammad Mahdi Akef,
and former first deputy and member of the
Guidance Bureau Muhammad Habib. Leading
women members of the Muslim Brotherhood
were also interviewed such as Makarem El
Dery, professor of Arabic literature at Al-Azhar
University and the only female member of the
movement fielded in the 2005 parliamentary
elections. Also interviewed was Camillia
Helmy, an engineer who is also the director of
the International Islamic Committee for
Woman and Child which is an affiliate of the
International Islamic Relief Committee. She is
one of the most active women in the Muslim
Brotherhood together with Hoda Abdel
Moneim, a lawyer, activist and one of the
leading women in the movement who was also
interviewed. Close advisors to the Muslim
Brotherhood were also informally interviewed.
6 For Western and Western-affiliated consumers,
there was also the English website, which again
had content packaged and selected differently
from its Arabic counterpart. The material
published on the English website is of a more
generic nature under the section on ‘Women and
Islam’, with a focus on showing that the Muslim
Brotherhood are committed to the principle of
equality. In the Arabic version on the other hand,
there are clearer stipulations on the kind of
policies that the MB advocate vis-à-vis reforming
social relations. The tone is less apologetic, and
the focus is on their agenda rather than the
sacred textual position on women.
7 Despite the fact that these figures’ writings do
not hold the ‘official endorsement’, there is no
doubt however, that many hold significant
power and legitimacy in the eyes of the rank
and file and hence, excluding their ideas and
perspectives ultimately means disregarding
the voices of leaders who have shaped the
ideology and policy of many members of the
movement, however, this will be tackled in a
future article.
8 The word he used is fashi and it was removed
in the edited version of this article, which
appeared in the collection of his articles that
was published by the second largest publishing
house owned by the Muslim Brotherhood Dar
el Da’wa (Al-Banna 1990: 304). The removal
of the word does not indicate that his
reverential position in the movement is
challenged (the MB held a grand event in
2006 to mark 100 years since his birth), only
that there is a more conscious attempt to
‘repackage’ his ideas to make them more
palatable to a wider audience today.
9 See, for example the struggle led by Doria
Shafik, which including going on a strike in
the journalists’ syndicate until Egypt’s
constitution recognises women’s rights to
political participation and representation.
10 El Da’wa (1981) Issue no 58, Cairo, Egypt.
11 The Mubadara addressed issues relating to the
position and role of women in its tenth point.
12 Interview with Camillia Helmy, June 2005.
13 This is also an issue that was critiqued by
renowned Sheikh Yusuf el Qaradawy, a figure
held in high esteem by the Brotherhood and




(accessed 16 October 2010).
14 See Tadros and Costa (2010) ‘Quotas: A
Highway to Power in Egypt’, in ‘Quotas: Add
Women and Stir’, IDS Bulletin 42.1.
15 See Cooke (2001) for an interview with El
Ghazali.
16 A faction within Sunni Islam that emerged in
Saudi Arabia and has spread worldwide to
advocate for a return to the way of life at the
time of the Prophet Mohammed and his
companions. It prescribes a most conservative
ideology vis-à-vis gender issues in particular.
17 Translated from the Arabic ma fi hokmaha.
18 Although only the government leadership
position is prohibited to women, there are
other positions too from which women are
prohibited such as leading men in prayer as
Imam. All members of the Muslim
Brotherhood confirmed that a woman cannot
lead men into prayer. Habib made the
concession that she can preach to men, as
Aisha, the wife of the Prophet did but that she
cannot act as imam because there is an order
in prayer in which men are to be in front
followed by young boys, then women.
19 See Tadros (2010) http://freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=384&key=253&parent=
24&report=86
20 See UNDP (2006).
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